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A VENDOR'S RIGHT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
In previous papers' I have treated of lack of mutuality as
a defence to a bill for the specific performance of a contract.
There is one instance, however, in which the "principle of
mutuality" is called into requisition to enable a court of
equity to grant the plaintiff's prayer for a decree directing
the defendant to perform his contractual obligations. I refer
to a bill brought by a vendor to force the vendee to pay the
purchase monev. The reiiei granted in sucn cases is tne
utvJect ot the presenc paper.
Perhaps the two earliest cases in which a vendor's right
to a bill in equity is discussed are Armiger v. Clark2 and
Lewis v.. Lord Lechmere.3 In the former case the Chief
Baron denied the jurisdiction on the ground that there
'The earlier papers on Specific Performance and the defence of Lack
of Mutuality are found in the May, July, August, September and
October numbers of this magazine for igoi.
'Bub, iii,1722.
%
io Mod. 503, 1722. The bill was granted without discussion of the
point that the plaintiff only wanted money in Hatton v. Gray, 2 Ch. - Cas.

164, 1684.
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was a remedy at law, 4 in the later the opposite onclusion

was reached by Lord Chancellor Macclesfield. He said
" ..that the remedy the vendor had at law upon the
articles was not adequate tothat of a bill in equity for a specific performance."" The counsel for the plaintiff in the
last-mentioned case gave, not only the reason adopted by the
Chancellor, but also argued "that upon mutual articles there
ought to be mutual remedies; that if the vendee had a'remedy
both in law and -equity, the vendor would not be upon a par
with him, unless he had so too."8
It will be noticed that these two reasons, the inadequacy
of the remedy at law, and the necessity for mutuality, have
no relation to each other. One or the other or both are
given as the foundation of the vendor's right in almost every
case where the matter is discussed' They are both repeated
in the next reported English case, Kenney v. Wexham.7
In other English cases only
the second reason, the necessity
8
for mutuality, is given.
Little need be said about the validity of the second reason,
that of mutuality. It mai be asked: "If a court of equity
enforces the obligations of one party to a contract, is that*
any reason why it should concern itself with the obligations
of the other party,, provided for these last there is an ade,quate remedy at law ?" It is probably impossible to demon-strate the conclusiveness of either a, positive or negative
answer to this question. The court of equity came into being
"If a man comes for a specific performance as to the land itself, -z
court of equity ought to crry it into exectition, because there-is no
remedy at law; but if it is to have a performance in payment bf the
money, they may have remedy for that at law." See page 112. The
case was also dismissed on other grounds.
'Page 5o6.
'Page 5o6.
' 6 Mad. 355, 1822.
'Withy v. Cotthe, x Sim. & Stew. 174, 1822; Adderley v. Dixon, i Sim.

&-Stew. 6o7, 1823, p. 612, both opinions being by Sir John Leach.
also Walker v. Eastern Counties R. R., 6 Hare 594, 1848, p. 602.

See

The English cas&s during the last fifty years have granted specific

performance to the vendor as a niatter of course, no reason being
assigned. See, for example, Morgan v. Holford, i Sma. & Giff. ioi,
1852; Cogent v. Gibson, 33 Beav. 557, 1864; Thomas Plate Glass Co. v.
Land & Sea Co.,'L. 1_ II Eq. Cas. 248, i87o.
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as a result of the accumulation of instances where the common law gave an inadequate remedy or no remedy at all.
Some will be impressed with the importance of confining
the jurisdiction to the defects of the common law. Others
will be impressed with the thought that there is nothing more
than fair play, if one party to a contract may seek the protection of the court, in permitting the other to do the same
thing.. Our conclusion as to which principle should prevail
in the particular case under discussion will be largely a
question of temperament.
The statement that the remedy at law is inadequate is
another matter. It will depend a good deal on the extent of
the remedy at common law. Where A. agrees to sell to B.
land for a sum certain, to give A. the right to specific .performance gives him merely a sum of money. If this identical
sum may be recovered at law, the remedy at law would seem
to -be adequate, unless there is -some defect in procedure:
On the other hand, if all that can be recovered at law is the
difference between the contract price and the market price,
then there -is at least more ground for saying that the remedy
at law is inadequate. I call attention to this difference in
the-weight of the reason which grants specific performance
to the vendor on the ground of the inadequacy of the legal
remedy, because the extent of the remedy at law -has been,
and seems yet in some jurisdictions to-be a matter of doubt.
In England, in the case of Lewis v. Lord Lechmee just
mentioned, the counsel for the plaintiff argued that all his
client could obtain at law was the difference between the
market and contract price.9 In giving as a reason for allowing the bill the inadequacy of the legal remedy Lord Macclesfield seems to have acquiesced in this view. On the other
hand, in Armiger v. Clark, the court appears to have thought
that the urchase money could be recovered at law. 10 In the _
last part ot the eignteentn ana nrst part ot the ineteenth century there is a apparently a general acquiescence in this last
idea. Thus, in Glazebrook v. Woodrow, :1 all the judges
assumed that. had the plaintiff vendor in that case averred
ioMod. p. 506.

"See supra, note 4.
118 T. R. 366, 1799.
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that he had tendered a proper conveyance of the land he
could have recovered the purchase money, and in Hawkins v.
Kemp,' 2 Lord Ellenborough, on -the purchaser'% refusal to
take, permitted the recovery by the vendor of full purchase
price.' 3 In none of the cases mentioned did the defendant
question the plaintiff's right, having properly averred and
proved that he had offered a good title, to recover the price4
stipulated in the contract. But in the case of Laid v. Pim,'
the vendor's right to recover the purchase price .at law being
questioned, Baron Parke said that the plaintiff could only
have damages, for the plaintiff could not have his money andhis land too. 15 The question does not seem to have come
again before the English courts, 16 though the fact that in
Morgan v. Metropolitan R. R. Co.,' 7 we find a vendor, on
the refusal of .the vendee to take, though no re-sale has been
made to third parties, suing for damages merely, and the
fact that the last English text-book on damages, Mayne,'
asserts that the vendor can only .recover damages, would
seem to indicate that the rule laid down by Baron Parkei
is now settled law in Eigland. In this country there is, as
we shall see considerable conflict on the question between
different jurisdictions.
The first case in America to raise the question of the
right of the vendor to obtain specific performance is tro
ably the Pennsylvania case of-Huber v. Burke.'9 This was
"3 East. 410, 1803.
' In Martin v. Smith, 6 East. 555, 18o, another- case before Lord
Ellenborough, the vendor, on the refusal of the vendee to take, sued
for the full purchase price. The defendant raised the objection that
the plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged his title. The case is decided
on the pleadings, no objection being made to the suit for the full purchase price. Chitty in his work on Pleading recognizes the practice by
inserting a special count for such a claim. See Chitty oii Pleading,
p. 292, Vol. 2, 5 Amer. ed.

"'7M. & W. 474, 1841.
"Page 478.
"It has, however, been raised in New Brunswick and decided in
accordance with the rule laid down in 'Lairdv. Pim. See Pugsley v.
Gillepie, 14 N. B. Rep. 195, 1872, p. 197.
1'

L. R. 3 C. P. 553, I868.

"See page ?13, 6,ed.

ii S. & R. 238, 1824. There is also an early case decided by the

A VENDOR'S RIGB'ET TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

69

an action of debt brought by the vendor to recover the
penalty in articles of agreement for the sale of land. Chief
Justice Gibson points out that as in Pennsylvania equity was
administered through the common law actions, the action of
debt was in the state a substitute for a vendor's bill in equity;
thus, impliedly, admitting that such a bill by a vendor is
proper. 20 Cook v. Grant,21 in which the opinion was likewise written b Gibson, is similar to Huberv. Burke. In this
last case, however, the judge develops the idea that at common law the plaintiff could, in an action of debt, always "
recover the full purchase price. The origin of this idea, as
seen in the note, is probably due to a misreading of certain
passages in Sugden on Vendors.22 Believing that the purchase money can be recovered at law, he'naturally explains
the jurisdiction of equity, not by the inadequacy of. the
legal remedy, but because "it was supposed that justice
' '23
required the remedies between the parties to be mutual.
Thus, in Pennsylvania the habit of administering equity in
common law actions did not, in the opinion of the man who
Supreme Court of the United States, in which the opinion is written
by Chief Justice Marshall. Marshall contents himself with declaring
that the right of the vendor is unquestioned: Cathcartv. Robinson, 30

U. S. 24 1831.
' He then proceeded to discuss whether, in the case before him, he
must regard the action as a bill in equity. - If he must, the instruction
of the trial judge, that the plaintiff should show himself entitled to all
the purchase money or recover nothing, was correct. Deciding that an
action for the penalty in the articles of agreement was not an action
for the purchase money, he held that the action was in effect not a bill
in equity, and therefore that the instruction of the trial judge was
erroneous.

1,6 S. & tg 198, 1827.
Judge Gibson's statement is: "It was formerly thought that as the
vendor wants nothing but the purchase money, which may be recovered
in an action of debt, . . . etc." See page 209. *By debt he doubtless means indebitatus assumpsit. The authority given by Gibson
Sugden on Vendors, page 164, 2 Amer. ed. i82o. Sugden, after stating,
that a vendor, can have specific performance, says: . . . "althoug
it appears to have been fornerly thought'.that as a vendor only wantI
the purchase money, his remedy was at law." This is not a direct
statement that at law the full purchase price could be recovered. There
is indeed no conclusive evidence of Sugden's opinion on that point.
' Page 209.
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then dominated the Supreme Court, give the vendor his
action for the full purchase price; that existed before. What
it did do was to require the parties to such an. action to discuss their respective rights as if the plaitiff had brought a
bill in equity, not an action at common law. 2 In Wilson v.
Clark,25 judge Gibson followed the earlier cases by assuming that the plaintiff vendor could, under ordinary circumstances, recover the full purchase price, but that the defences
which could be raised to a bill in England for. specific performance could also be raised in the common law action in
Pennsylvania. Finding in the' case before him a lack of
mutuality in the remedy, he permitted the plaintiff to recover
damages, but not the purchase price. 26 It will be noted that
the result of administering equity under common law forms
2udge

Gibson says:

"But, in an action on the contract, even the

English courts take cognizance of equitable objections, and, in Pennsylvania, where we have no separate court to control the exercise of
legal rights, there is still greater reason for doing so." Page 209. Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed because of these "equitable objections" arising from the facts.
He refers, as authority for the above quoted assertion, to Sugden,
page 178. The text of Sugden here supports his assertion as far as
"cognizance of equitable objections" is concerned; but the cases referred
to are actions by purchasers to recover deposits of purchase money,
because of failure of title or other reason. See, for example, the cases
cited. Alpass v. Watkins, 8 Term. 516, i8oo; Elliott v. Edwards, 3 Bos.
& Pull- 8i,'i8w2; Maberley v. Robins, 5 Taun. 625, 1814. Sugden goes
on to say that from these cases it may be inferred that in an action
at law by th6 vendor for the non-performance of the agreement the
court can take into account equitable considerations. But he nowhere
makes the assertion that the purchase money can be reiovered at law,
either in the action of debt or any other action. For a similar positive
inference that Sugden is an authority for the position that at law tife
purchaser could recover the full purchase pfice, see Richardsv. Edick,
17 Barb. 26o N. Y. 1853, p. 265, per Gridley, J.
ZI W. & S. 554, 1841.

:" The lack of mutuality arose from the fact that the vendor had not
. signed the contract, as required by the Pennsylvania Statute of Frauds,
,before the vendor can be deprived of an interest in the land. The statute as interpreted by the courtspermits the vendor or vendee of land
to -recover damages on a parod contract of shle. For a full discussion
of the local Statute of Frauds, the case in -question, and the identical
case of Measen v. Kaine,. 63 Pa. 335, I869, see Fifth Paper, October
number,. igoi, pp. 573, 445.
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is, in these instances, to prevent a plaintiff from recovering
at law the full purchase price in a case where, if it had not
been for the admission of equitable principles, the full purchase price could have been recovered. In Tripp v. Bishop, 7
the court followed their long-expressed opinion, and allowed
a vendor to recover the full purchase price in an action of
assumpsit which the court treated as a bill in equity.
In New York, as in the early cases in Pennsylvania, it
was admitted that, as the vendor can recover at law the
full purchase price, 28 the remedy at law was adequate, and

again the necessity for mutuality is given as the sole ground
for permitting him to bring a bill in equity against the
29
vendee.
Similar to this position of the early Pennsylvania and New
York courts is that taken by Judge Caldwell in the Circuit
Courts of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in confirming a
5 Pa. 424, 1867.
56
In Green v. Reynolds, 22 Johns. cases 207 N. Y., i8o8, a vendor of
land sued the vendee at law for the full purchase price. He did not
declare that he had tendered a deed, and judgment was given for the
defendant. Like the English cases of the same period, see notes II to
13, supra, it is assumed that it is proper to sue for the purchase price. A
similar assumption is made in Jones v. Gardner, IO Johns. 266, 1813.
There the plaintiff failed to recover the contract price only because he
failed to show that he had offered a proper deed. See also Parker v.
Parmele,2o Johns. 13o N. Y., 1822, and Johnson v. Wygant, ix Wend. 48
N. Y., 1833. In Franchot v. Leach, 5 Cow. 5o6- N. Y., 1826, where the
defendant vendee was to pay $ioo down and $2oo on bond and mortgage,
the plaintiff recovered $3o0. There is no discussion of the question.
The point, however, was raised and discussed in Richards v. Edick, 17
Barb. 26o N. Y., 1853, pp. 264 and 265. The court there regards Laird
v. Pim, 7 M. & W. 474, 1841, see note 14, supra, as expressing the
proper rule, but they regard themselves as bound by the long-settled
practice of the state. The case of Williams v. Field referred to in
Richards v. Edick, as containing a full discussion of this subject, does
not seem to be reported on this point. It is probably the case reported
on another question in i How. N. Y. Pr. 214, 1845.
" The court in Brown v. Haff, 5 Paige Ch. 235 N. Y., 1835, admitted
'the remedy at law to be adequate, but gave no reason in view of this
fact for allowing the bill. In this case there was also equitable jurisdiction on the ground of discovery. In Phillips v. Berger, 8 Barb. 527
N. Y., i85o, aff. 2 Barb. Sup. Ct. 6o8, the court place the jurisdiction
on the ground of mutuality. See also Schroeppel v. Hopper, 40 Barb.
425 N. Y., 1863.
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decision of the Circuit Court of the United States for the
district of Kansas. He assumes, that the vendor could
recover the purchase price at law and places the jurisdiction
in equity on the rule of mutuality.30 Mutuality is also given
as the sole reason for permitting the vendor to bring his bill
against the vendee by the courts of New Jersey,31 North
Carolina, 32 Georgia,33 Arkansas, 84 and West Virginia. 5
The writer is not aware of any decisidn in these states
determining the question whether at law the plaintiff could
bring an action for the full purchase price. In one of them,
North Carolina, the adoption of code procedure renders
it less likely that the question of the original right of the
plaintiff at law will be ever-passed upon by the courts.86
In some jurisdictions, where the court has regarded the
right of the vehdor to recover the purchase money at law
as unquestioned, they have not followed the general trend
just indicated and supported the jurisdiction in equity on
the ground of mutuality. An instance of the way in which a
court may still regard the remedy at law as inadequate in
spite of the fact that the price could be recovered at law, is
Gregoriev. Bulow, decided by the Court of Appeals of South
Carolina.37 Oref the reasons given for this opinion is that:
"If the titles are not made within the exact time limited by
the contract, or if to a small part of the land sold, of even
inconsiderable value, the vendor has'no title, and does not,
"Raymond y. San Gabriel Val. Land & Water Cq., 53 Fed. 883,
1893, p. 885.

'Hopper v. Hopper, I6 N. J.Eq. 147, 1863; Semble,.Rothholtz v.
Schwartz, 46 N. J.Eq. 477,, 1890, which, however, as treated by the
court, is not a case involving specific performance by vendor.
Sprigs v. Sanders, Phil1. Eq. 67 N. C., 1866.
'Forsyth v. McCauley, 48 Ga. 403, I873; fackens v. Nicolson, 7o
Ga. i98, 1883.
"Greenfield v. Carlton, 30 Ark. 547, 1875.
.Baungardnerv. Leavitt, 13 S. E. 67 W. Va., i8gi. In this suit
jurisdiction was- also taken to prevent multiplicity of suits at law, the
legal title to the property sold having passed into the hands of third
parties.
"For the effect of this code procedure on the questions discussed in
this paper, see infra, note 78. See also for Arkansas Code Procedure, ib.
"Rich.'Eq. Cas. 235 S. C., 1832, pp. 240, 241.
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therefore, tender a conveyance for the whole, there can be no
recovery at law."3 8 Another reason given for the inadequacy.
of the legal remedy is the fact that if the vendee should
happen to have judgments against him, the moment the
vendor's titles are produced at the trial at law the vendee
is entitled to receive them, "and the land becomes liable to
all the previous liens to the entire destruction of the plaintiff's chance of payment."3 9
A conclusion directly opposite to that of the South Carolina'court has apparently been reached in Maine. There,
in the early case of Ana v. Plummer,4 ° we have a direct
decision that at law the vendor can recover the full purchase price. In Porter v. Land and Water.Company,41 the
plaintiff vendor brought a bill in equity for the purchase
price. The plaintiff did not, it seems, allege that his remedy
at law was inadequiate. The court in dismissing the bill
juristake the position that the court does not take equitable
42
diction in any case where there is a remedy at law.
Page

24o.

Illustrations of time being the essence of contracts to

sell land at law are: Wilde v. Fort, 4 Taun. 334, i81, and Noble v.
Edwards, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 378, 1877. In the later case the action was
brought before the provisions of the Judicature Act (see Article 25,
Sub. s. 7), which declared that time shall not be presumed to be the
essence of a contract, went into effect: See page 392.
Page 24o. In the recent case of Hammond v. Foreman, 26 S. E.
212 S. C., 1897, the Supreme Court, while expressly reaffirming Gregorie
v. Bulow, adopt what they believe to be the idea of Mr. Pomeroy in his
work on Equity Jurisprudence, section I39; namely, that the jurisdiction
over specific performance being exclusive, one does not have to show
the inadequacy of the legal remedy.
,4 Me. 258, i826. The case of Robinsonv. Heard, i5 Me. 296, 1839,
is not contra, but in accord with the earlier case. The plaintiff in the
last. case had not offered a deed at time of trial. The court held that
this prevented him from recovering the full purchase price, but say that
. peihaps the rule of 'damhad the plaintiff presented a deed, ".
ages prescribed' by the judge (this rule was the full purchase price)
would appear to. us to be correct. It would hold the defendant to pay
what he agreed. The plaintiff did not stipulate to receive any part of
that sum in land.' Page 302.
84 Me. 195, i892.
'It should be noted that the case may be regarded as one which
merely enforces a rule of practice that a bill in equity, which is brought
for an obligation for which there is an action at common law, must allege
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So far we have dealt with jurisdictions in which the
power of the courts .to give specific perfornance is not
limited by statute, 43 and in which the vendor could recover
the purchase price at law. In all but the last instance
mentioned the vendor, nevertheless, can proceed against the
vendee in equity.
There are other jurisdictions where the power pf the court
of equity is unrestricted by statute, which have adopted the
present English rule, that at common law the vendor can
recover only the difference between the market and the contract price. This seems to be true of Vermont, 4" New Hampshire,4 5 and Oregon. 46 In the first-mentioned state, I am not.
aware that the question of the -vendor's right to specific performance in equity has arisen. In Oregon in the case
referred to, *Johnson v. Wadsworth,' specific performance
was granted the vendor on the ground both of mutuality and
of the inadequacy of the common law remedy.47 They also
refer with approval to an idea suggested by Mr. Pomeroy ;48
namely, that the decree is not purely one for the payment
of money, as it may compel the vendee to accept a deed.. It
may be suggested that the decree need not compel the defendant to accept a deed, and such acceptance by the defendthat the remedy at law is inadequate, and not merely set forth facts
from which the court can draw that inference. The court nowhere
say the full purchase price can be recovered at law, neither do court
or cdunsel refer to Ana v. Plummer, supra, note 4o. On the other
hand, both the counsel for the plaintiff and the counsel for the defendant,
admit that at law there is an action for the purchase price. See page
197.

'In all the states referred to, the equitable jurisdiction of the state
owes its origin to the constitution or to legislative enactments, but the
jurisdiction is not especially restricted.
"See Sawyer v. McIntyre, 18 Vt 27, 843, p. 31. The case was that
B. sold stoves to A., agreeing to take back all stoves unsold7 by A. at
end of the year at'a certain price. B. would not take back the unsold
stoves. A. sued. B. and recovered' the full price agreed upon, on the
theory that on notice by A. to B. to take back the stoves the'property
in the stoves revested in B. - .
"Griswold -v. Sabin, S N. H. 167, 18 7it pp. 170, 171; Woodbury v.
Jones, 44 N. H. 2o6, 1862, p. 2o9.
'lohnston v. Wadsworth, 34 P- 13 Ore., 1893, pp. 13-15.
Pages 13,14.
Pbm. Spe. Per., § 6, 2 ed. 1897.
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ant is a mere result of the real object of the decree, which
is to compel the defendant to pay a sum of money.49 .In
New Hampshire, in the case of Eckstein v. Downing,0
.the court take two positions; the first being that though
equity is part of the common law of New Hampshire, 51 if
the damages which may be recovered at law are adequate,
the courts will not necessarily follow the English cases, and
grant. specific performance. on the ground of mutuality.
Secondly, in the case before them, where the plaintiff had
agreed to sell his yacht to the defendant for certain stocks
and bonds; that the sale did not differ from a sale for money;
that the plaintiff was not injured by the breach, and if he
was; that "it was not found as a fact, nor can it be inferred
as a matter of law from the facts, that the plaintiff's remedy
at law is not convenient and complete." 52 The case, however, does not go so far as to say that the vendor could not
have specific performance if he could allege and prove that
damages would be inadequate compensation. 3 The point
seems to be that thecourt feels that damages at law must be
presumed to be adequate,- even though the purchase price is
not recovered, unless the court has evidence to the contrary.
The evidence wanted is not made clear by the opinion. The
case .is interesting as it is the only one which seems to doubt
the assumption that the remedy at law is incomplete when
only the difference between the contract price and the socalled market price can be recovered.5"
The cases so far reviewed are all that I have been able to
find which discuss the rights of the vendor to the purchase
money either at law or in equity, except cases in those states
where the jurisdiction of the courts of equity over specific
performance is expressly limited by statute to instances in
which there is not an adequate remedy at law. We shall now
turn to the cases in this second class of states; and first to
those in Pennsylvania.
"An Oregon trial court gave specific performance to a vendor in the
earlier case of Sandford v. Wheelan, 12 Ore. 3oi, 3oi, i885; the case
was reversed on other grounds.
'64 N. H. 248, 1886.

"See lb., page 259 and cases cited.
2lb., page 26o.
1lb., page 258.
See infra, note go, for a discussion of this question.
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We have seen that during the early part of the nineteenth
century equity was administered in Pennsylvania through
the common law actions, and that Judge Gibson allowed the
vendor to bring an action of debt for the full purchase priced
and though he believed the action could have been broughl
at law in England, and supposedly also in Pennsylvania, he
treated the action as a bill in equity.55 In. 1836, the
legislature conferred upon the courts df common pleas of
Philadelphia County jurisdiction in equity in certain classes
of cases, among others: "Affording specific relief when a
recovery in damages would be an.inadequate remedy."5
This statute was extended to all the common pleas courts
of the State in 1854. 57 ' InDalzell v. Crawford,58 the court'
held that, under the facts ot, tfe cAse, -the-veildor could
maintain a bill for specific performance. The facts referred to w~iere the obligation of the vendee to pay part
of the purchase money in cash, giving a bond and mortgage for the residue. Under such circumstances, the
remedy at common law was considered inadequate, but
the court refuse to decide the question of the ability of the
vendor, who sought only by the payment of money, to obtain
relief in equity. In Tiernanv. Roland,59 the Supreme Court
of the State grants specific performance to a v;endor; but here
again the obligation of the vendee was to give a bond and
mortgage as well as pay money. At this time the Supreme
Couit would have probably allowed the vendor to recover
in equity the purchase price, though the payment of a sum
certain at a definite time was the only obligation of the irendee. This is shown by the assumption in the case o! Bodine
v. Glading,0° that the vendor in that case, who' merely
wanted money, would have succeeded if the contract had
been mutual. The right of the vendor is indeed positively
asserted. in Finley v. Aiken,61 though as in Bodine v. GladSee note ig.
P. and L. Dig. of Pa. Laws, Col. 710.
P. and L Dig. of Pa. Laws; Col. 713:
i Pars. Eq.37, 1842: In the Courts of .Common Pleas of.Philadelphia County.
Is Pa. 429, i85o.
e02I.Pa. 50 1853.
'i Grant. 83, 1854.
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ing the bill is dismissed on other grounds, and, unlike Bodine
v. Glading, the vendee was to give a bond and mortgage0 2
But in Kauffman/s AppJ36 where the vendee had only to pay
money,- the bill ot the vendor was dismissed, on the ground
that the remedy at law, being identical, the express words
of the statute prevented the court from adopting the English practice. Tiernan v. Roland is referred to as a case
where the plaintiff was entitled to a bond and mortgage as
well as money, and, therefore, in that case the remedy at
common law was not complete. Kauffman's Appeal has
been followed in several later instances ;64 in none of these,
however, has the question of the right of the vendor been
discussed when the agreement of the vendee is to give a bond
and mortgage. Indeed, this distinction between the completeness of the remedy at common law, in the event that
the vendee is obliged to pay all the purchase price
in cash, and where he -can allow part to remain on
mortgage, may be questioned. The right to give a bond
'Judge Lowrie, who wrote the opinion of the majority, seems to
have been *under the impression that the question before the court
was, whether the existence, before the passage of the statute granting
equity jurisdiction of the jractice of granting equitable relief under
common law forms, prevented the courts from entertaining bills in
equity in cases where, owing to the peculiar practice referred to, equitable relief could be obtained in a common law action? This question
he answers in favor of the equitable jurisdiction. As a general assertion the learned judge is borne out by the cases. The statute, as we
have seen in the case of vendors, supra, page -, note 27, did not take
from litigants any right to seek in common law actions such equitable relief as they would have had, had the statute not been passed.
On the other hand the practice of administering equity in common
law actions does not prevent the bringing, of a bill in equity under the
equitable jurisdiction conferred by the statute. But while this may be
generally true it is not true of the jurisdiction over specific performance, which is especially limited by the statute to cases where the
remedy at law is inadequate. Judges Black and Knox dissented. They
would have denied a bill in equity to a vendor irrespective of the fact
whether the vendee was to pay money or to pay money and give a bond
and mortgage. All the members of the court united in dismissing the
bill on the ground of the misrepresentations of the plaintiff.
Y 55 Pa. 383, 1867.
Dech's App., 57 Pa. 467, 1868; Smaltz's App., 99 Pa. 3io, 1882;
Semble Weaver v. Shenk, 154 Pa. 206, 1893.
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and mortgage for part of te purchase price is a privilege.
of the vendee, not a right of the vendor. The court decreeing specific performance againsf the vendee who has the
privilege of giving a bond and mortgage will always allow
him to pay the full purchase price in cash.6 4a Indeed if they
did not allow this they would be enforcing a contract to borrow money, which a court of equity will not do.4b Again,
suppose a jurisdiction like Pennsylvania, wrhere the
vendor can recover the full purchase pride at law. In
such a jurisdiction what are the rights at law of the vendor
where the vendee is entitled to give a bond and mortgage in
lieu of part of the purchase price? The only case found an.Seyring this question is .Pranchet v. .Leach.65 There the yen,tre recovered the full purchase price at law, though under the
,contract the vendee had the privilege of giving a bond and
mortgage for part of the price. If this case is to be followed the'remedy at law -is more than adequate where the
vendee is to give a-bond and mortgage.
There is 'one case, however, in which the distinction
adopted by the Pennsylvania courts has more justification.
Besides contracts in which the vendee agrees to pay
the full price in cash at one time, and contracts in which the
vendee agrees to pay part in cash and give a bond and mortgage for the residue, there are contracts in which the vepdee
may agree to pay in installments, the conveyance to bb made
on the payment of the last installment. In this case in all
jti-isdictions where the-vendor could recover the full price
where the I ayment was to be made on a day certain, there
would appear to be no reason why the vendor cotild not
recover at law each installnient as it fell due. Where, however, the 'vendee agrees to pay in installments, the vendor
to convey on the payment of the first 'nstallment, the vendee
to give a bond and mortgage to secure the remaining payments, then the rights of the vendor, at law in the jurisdictions mentioned become more complicated. Having offered
.to convey as each installment became due he would appear
to have a right, on .the falling due of the last installment,
4

a" See for example Schroeppel v. Hopper, 40 Barb. 425 N. Y., 1863.

.b See Rogers v. Challis, 27 Beav. i75, 1859,
" 5 Cow. 506 X. Y., 1826.
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to sue for the fall purchase price.esa If he sued for the first insiallment he would have to offer a deed, and except possibly
in Pennsylvania, there is no way for the common law court to
make the acceptance of the deed by the vendee dependent on
executing the bond and mortgage. In this instance, therefore, there would appear to .be some justification for the
distinction raised in Kauffman's Appeal, between the
vendor, who was entitled to the whole purchase price, and
one whose vendee was entitled to give a bond and mortgage;
but it is doubtful whether the distinction is justified in Pennsylvania.
.The equitable jurisdiction over specific performance in
Massachusetts is also confined by statute to cases: "when the
parties have not a plain, adequate and complete remedy at
the common law."6 6 In two. cases, occurring about the
middle of the last century, Gill v. Bicknell" and Jacobs v.
Peterborough and Shirley Railroad Company, 8 the Supreme Court of the state express the opinion, that as a vendor
could recover the purchase price at law, he should not be
permitted to bring a bill in equity. Both bills in the cases
mentioned *ere also dismissed on other grounds. In the case
of the Old Colony Railroad Company v. Evans,6 9 these opinions were reversed. It was held that at law the vendor could
only recover the difference in value between the contract and
the market price. The remedy at law being considered
inadequate, the vendor's bill was allowed. It is probable'
that this case is still law, and that in the state a bill in equity
is the proper remedy for both parties in all contracts of sale,
where the subject matter of the sale is real property or personal property not duplicable on the market. The equitable'
jurisdiction in this case is based on the assumption that the
full purchase price could not be obtained at law. There
seems to be, however, one instance in which the courts of
the state have allowed the vendqee to recover at. law the full"
purchase price. This is illustrated by the case of Thorndike
"L See Jones v. Newhall, iS 1ass. 244, 1874, p.
"Gen. Sts., c. 113, § 2.

2 .Cush. 355, Mass., 1848, p: 358.
"8 Cush.

223

Mass, i85i, p.

6 Gray, 25 Mass., x856.

225.

250.

-
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v. Locke.7 0 The case was, that B. sold stock to A.; B. agreeing to .take back the stock, at a stipulated price which A.
had not resold by a specified time. In allowing A. to recover
this price the court said: "The plaintiff had parted with his
money on the faith of the defendant's agreement to repay
it at the expiration of the year." This is apparently proceeding on the principle that the vendor can recover the full purchase price at law if he has spent money under the prior
provisions of the contract, and it follows from this decision
that in a case so circumstanced the plaintiff coilld not recover
in equity; indeed the Supreme Court of the state did in such
a case dismiss the vendor's bill.7 1 The principle of Thorndike v. Locke also explains the refusal of the court to take
jurisdiction of the vendor's bill in Jones v. Newhall.7 2 There
the defendant had agreed to buy from the plaintiff his interest in two land companies and a certain promissory note.
The purchase price for the whole was to be paid in installments, and on the payment of certain of the installments a
certairi part of the shares of the land companies was to be
transferred. After the plaintiff had received payment for and
transferred his interest in one of the land companies the
defendant refused to go on with the contract. 'The court
regarded the agreement to sell the interests in both land
companies as an entire contract. The plaintiff had, therer
fore, parted with his prope ty
on the faith of the cointract,
and the court declares the remedy at law to be adequate, the
plaintiff having his option of waiting until all installments
fell due and bringing one suit for the entire purchase price,
or suing for each installment as it fell due.73
In Connecticut there was a general statute providing that
courts of equity shall take cognizance only of niatters in
which relief cannot be had at cemmon law. 74 There is
apparently some doubt as tW whether this statute is not
repealed. 75 In any event the court's attitude toward the
98 Mass. 340, 1867.
Noyes v. Marsh, 123 Mass.- 286, 1877.
" 115 Mass. 244, 1874.

T

See id., page 250.
"t Rev. Stats., 1875, p. 413, sec. 5.
See Hodges v. Kowing, 58 Conn. 12, iSfg, p. 21.
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statute was that it was merely declaratory of a general principle of chancery jurisdiction.78 This interpretation of such
a statute would be important in a jurisdiction where the
court thought that the vendor could recover the full purchase
price at law. In such a jurisdiction the opinion that the
statute was merely declaratory of the common law would
enable a plaintiff vendor tc bring a bill in equity on the
ground of mutuality. In Connecticut it has no practical
effect .on the question under discussion, as it is the opinion
of the court, expressed in the same case, that at law the
77
plaintiff vendor would be restricted to damages.
Thus in those states where the jurisdiction of equity over
specific performance is limited by statute to .cases in which
the common law does not afford an adequate remedy, to
ascertain whether a bill in equity may be brought by. the
vendor, it is first necessary to know whether in the jurisdiction the full purchase price can be obtained by the vendor at
law. If the vendor cannot obtain at law the full purchase
price tln a bill in -equity is a proper remedy. If the full
purchase can be obtained by the vendor at law then the tendency is to deny the right to proceed in equity. This tendency is, however, not universal. In a jurisdiction where the
case has not been decided it is possible that the courts will
uphold the equitable jurisdiction on the ground of mutuality,
and because the statute, though apparently limiting the
jurisdiction to cases where the common law is deficient is
regarded as merely expressing an accepted principle of
equity jurisdiction, and not as limiting that jurisdiction.
It remains to discuss the effect of the reformed American
or Code Procedure, adopted in a number of the states. It
will have been noticed that the two classes of quesiions
which arise when a vendor seeks "to obtain the full contract price are, First: Does the law allow such a recovery?
"Munson v. Munson, 30 Conn. 425, 1862.
T
Hodges v. Knowling, 58 Conn. 12, 1889, p. 2!.

See also Andrew v.

Babcock, 26 Ati. 715, Conn., 1893. Connecticut has, and had at the time
of this decision, one action for the enforcement of equitable and legal

remedies. The -complaint in the case was brought and tried on the
theory of a bill in equity,' and 'had to be sustained as such. See
infra.
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Second: The proper proceedings to bring. In some jurisdictions the forms of actions at law and the bill in equit3
are expressly abolished, 78 in others the same result -h
reached by providing that hereafter in the jurisdictior
there shall be but one form of. action for the enforcement and protection of private rights.79 The Arkansas
Code, though as stated in the note, providing that therf
shall be but one form of civil action, declares that the pro
ceedings in a civil action may be of two kinds, legal o
equitable.8 0 So in Iowa, though all forms of action art
abolished, proceedings in civil actions may be of two kinds
ordinary and equitable.8 ' It would appear, therefore, tha"
in these states the code has in no wise affected the possibilit)
of the two classes of questions just referred to arising. As,
therefore, in Iowa, before the .present code it was proper
82
for the purchdser to sue for the full purchase price at law,
it may be supposed that it is not proper to sue the vendor for
the full purchase price in an equitable action except the
equitable action was maintained on the ground of mutuThis is done expressly in the following states: Arkansas, see Dig.
Stats., 1894, § 56o4; Indiana, see Stats., 3896, § 249; Iowa, see Anno.
Code, 1897, tit. xviii, part iii, Code Civil Prac., chap 1, § 3426; Kansas,
see Gen. Stats., igoi, chap. lxxx, § 4438; Minnesota, see Stats., 1894,
chap. lxvi, tit. I, § 5131; Nebraska, see Comp. Stats., § 5592, i897, Code
of Civ. Pro., § 2; New York, see Chas. Pocket Code Civ. Pro., 1901,
9 3339,.Code Civ. Pro., § 69; North arolina, see Battle's Revisal, 1873,
Code Civ. Pro., tit. iii, § 12; North Dakota, see Rev. Codes, I8.9, § 5181,
Code of Civ. Pro., §§ 33 and 34; South Dakota, see Grantham's Anno.
Stats., igoi, § 6o3o; Wyoming, see Rev. Stats., 1899, § 3443.
" California, see'Code Civ. Pro., 1897, part ii, tit. i, § 3o7; Connecticut, see Gen. Stats., 1888, chap. Ixix, tit. xviii, § 87; Missouri, see
Rev. Stats., 1899, chap. viii, art. i, § 539; Montana, see Codes Anno.,
1895; Code Civ. Pro., part ii, tit. i, § 46o; Nevada, see Cutting's Comp.
Laws, igoo, § 3o96, Code Civ. Prac., tit. i, § i; Ohio, see Bate's Anno.
Stats., 1897, § 4971; South Carolina, see Rev. Stats., 1893, vol. 2, Code

Civ. Pro., part ii, tit. i, § 89; Texas, see Rev. Stats, i895, arts. 1177-x1go; Washington, see Ballinger's Anno. Code and Stats., 1897, § 4793.
" Dig. Stats., i894, § 56o7. Compare ib., §§ 4918 and 4919.
'Anno. Code,.I897, tit. xviii, part iii; Code Civ. Pro., chap. i, § 3426.
'Goodfoster v. Porter, ii Iowa, 16I, Ig6o, p. 164. The 'present
code was adopted in 1873.
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ality.8 3 In the other states mentioned the style of the action
and the pleadings are the same, whether the relief sought
falls under the equitable or legal jurisdiction of the court.
When the character of trial for the issue is to be determined
the question of the origin of the relief sought may become
important. Thus, in Connecticut it is expressly provided that
where the action under the old practice would not present a
question properly cognizable in equity, either party has a
right to trial by jury.8 4 In this state, therefore, if the plain-tiff vendor or the defendant vendee should demand a jury
trial, the question of the relief originally granted to the
vendor at common law, and the effect of such relief on the
equitable jurisdiction of the court, would ha-.e to be decided.
Many of the codes provide, that issues of fact for the
recovery of specific real or personal property or for money
must be tried by. jury, unless a jury trial is wived. 5
In these states it would at first appear that whether the
vendor sought his purchase money under the common law
or equitable jurisdiction of the court, the issue of fact in the
case must go to the jury, and, provided the court thought
"It should, however, be noted that the case cited was one in which
the plaintiff in fulfilling the prior provisions of the contract had expended money; see, for cases basing a distinction on this point, supra,
note 7o.

Connecticut, see Gen. Stats., 1888, chap. lxxiv, tit. xviii, § 1O3O.
California, see Code of Civ: Pro., 1897, part ii, tit. viii, chap. iii, §
392; Kansas, see Gen. Stats., 1897, see Code of Civ. Pro., § 276; Minne-

sota, see Stats., 1894, chap. lxvi, § 536o; Missouri, see Rev. Stats., i8g9,
chap. viii, art. vii, § 69i; Montana, see Codes Anno., 1895, Code Civ.
Pro., part ii, tit. viii, chap. iii, § 1034; Nebraska, see Comp. Stats., 1897,
§ 5851, Code Civ. Pro., chap. ii, § 28o; North Carolina, see Battle's Rev.,
1873, chap. xvii, Code Civ. Pro., tit. x, chap. ii, § 224; North Dakota, see
Rev. Codes, i899, chap. x, art. ii, § 542o, Code Civ. Pro., §236; Ohio, see
Stats., 1897, § 5130; South Carolina, Rev. Stats., 1893, vol. ii,'Code
Civ. Pro., part ii, tit. viii, chap. ii, § 274; South Dakota, Grantham's
Anno. Stat., 19O1, § 6239; Washington, see Ballinger's Anno. Code and
Stats., 1897, § 4967; Wyoming, see Rev. Stats., 1899, § 3659. In New

York it is provided that an issue of fact in which the complainant
demands a sum of money only must be tried by jury unless a jury trial

is waived or a defence made; Chase's Pocket Code Civ. Pro., I9Ol, §
968. The reference referred to cannot be had without the consent of
both parties, except in cases requiring the examination of accounts,
ib., §

1013.
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he could recover under either jurisdiction, it would be unnecessary-to determine which in order to decide any question of procedure. There would- seem, howevdr, to be a
considerable conflict of opinion in regard to the proper interpretation of this provision,"( and, though I know of no case
discussing the point, it would appear to be doubtful, whether,
if the court in any of the jurisdictions having this provision,
thought that their right to give the vepdor the' purchase
money was derived from their equitable jurisdicfion, they
would not have the right to refuse a jury trial. In three
states, Indiana, Nevada, and Texas, all civil actions are
triable by jury, unless a jury trial is waived by the parties.8 7
In these states, in suits by purchasers for the full purchase
money, the only question which could arise would be
whether, under either the equity or common-law jurisdiction of the court, the plaintiff could maintain his suit. The
opinion that it was a suit properly falling, on the one hand
under equity, or, on the other hand, under the common law,
would in no wise affect the pleadings or the mole of trial.'.
Under the old practice; Where the vendor is permitted to
recover the full purchase price at law, it is probably necessary
for him to produce the deed at the trial. In -equity the'
defendant will not be made to pay the full purchase price
unless the plaintiff shows himself able to make a good title.
Followirig this general idea, the. court of Nebraska, working
under .acode, said that a plaintiff vendor who wanted the
full purchase price must offer a deed or produce it at a trial,
Compare Woodinan v. Davis, 32 Kan. 344, 1884, page 47; Berkey v.
Judd, 14 Minn. 394, i86g; Brundridge v. Goodlove, 30 0. S. 374, T876.
"'Indiana, see Homer's Anno. Stats., 1896, § -516; Nevada, see Cutting's Comp. Laws, I9oo, § 3252, Code Civ. Trac., chap. iii, § 157 (a
reference can be had in the cases involving the investigation of accounts,
see ib. and § 328); Texas, see Rev. Stats.,. 1895, arts. 1177-1190, compare ib., art. 1335.

' The doubt expressed by the Supreme Court.of Indiana, in the case
of Porter v. Travis, 4o Ind. 556, 1872, as to whether at law a purchaser
could or could not recover the full purchase price, need therefore never
be resolv'ed, as the court in the case referred dssume that either in law,
or, if not in law in equity, the purchaser can-recover the full purchase
price. See pp. 559-561. The code procedure was adopted in 1881.
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but that he who sued only for damages need not do so.8 9
It may be presumed that this rule would be followed in other
states practicing under a code.
Whether the latter should recover at law the full purchase
price, or, or if he can recover at law, whether he should also
recover in equity is a matfer of importance only from the
point of view of pr6cedure. It would perhaps lead us
too far afield 'to discuss the policy of allowing the vendor, whether at law or in equity, to recover from the
vendee the sum which the latter was under obligation to
pay. It has always seemed to the writer that the burden of proof should in every case be thrown on a defendant who would deny to the plaintiff the right to have an
exact fulfilment of the contract; that something could be
said in favor of preventing a suit for damages on a broken
contract where a -decree for specific performance could be
obtained, but that the presumption should always be in favor
of one who asked nothing but that which the defendant had
agreed to give. Be that as it may, the important point to
see in connection with the rights of the vendor of real
property is that the same reasoning which would deny in
such a case the payment of the full purchase pice
to the vendor would deny the land to the vendee.
Specific performance is given to the vendee, not because large damages would not. be an adequate compensation, but because it is impossible to duplicate a particular lot of land. Being impossible to duplicate, its value
is a matter of inference and opinion. It is impossible
accurately to measure in money the loss to him who fails
to obtain the land for which he barganed. This is not because
the vendee may be peculiarly affected by the beauty or the
adaptability to his purposes of the land in question. Courts
cannot take into account the individual tastes and characterWasson v. Palmer, I7 Neb. 330, 1885, p. 332. For this opinion they
cite Laird v. Pim, see supra, note 14, which would seem to indicate that
they derived their right to grant the vendor the full purchase price
solely from their equitable jurisdiction. But Sedgwick's use of the
case as a positive authority for the proposition that at law only
ddmages. to the extent of the difference in value between the contract
and the market price can be recovered by the vendor is hardly justifiable.
See Sedgwick on Damages, p. 214, 8 ed., i891.
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istics of their suitors. It is because it is impossible for a jury
to estimate the money loss, the loss to the average man in
the plaintiff's situation, that specific performance is givento the 'vendee. In this respect the Vendor, where the breach
is committed by the vendee, is in exactly the same situation.
One piece of money is as good to him as another. But
whereas he was to have the purchase price, he has the land,
the value of which is only a matter of opifiion. His loss is conjectural, and damages based on an attempted estimate are
just as inadequate a remedy as in the case of the vendor. In
both cases at law the plaintiff recovers a sum of money said
to be the difference between the contract and the market price.
The vice of this is the assumption that in the case of land
there is a market price in the sense that there ,is a market
price for stock listed on the exchange, or corn, or hogs.
The conception "market price," when applied to these last,
involves both the ability to duplicate the commodity, and an
efficient demand-that is, a sufficient number of persons willing to buy at the price to take any reasonable amount
offered. Neither of these facts is present in regard to any
piece of land. It is true that the vendor, where the vendee
has committeed the breach, can sell the land under the
hammer, and sue the vendee for the difference between
the price obtained and the contract price. But in so doing
he would lose his vendor's lien for the unpaid purchase
money, the amount he sued for being in the case supposed
practically unpaid purchase money. Again, is a vendor safe
in allowing a sale of the land to take place unless a fair price
is bid?. If real estate experts testified that the land was
sacrificed, the right of the vendor to recover the difference
between the price he had received, and'the'price the vendor
agreed to pay, may be questioned.9 0 Thus the arguments
which support specific performance- of contracts for the sale
of land at the instance of the vendee, support the vendor in
his demand for the full purchase price.William Draper Lewis.
The burden of proving in such a case ihat the sale was "properly
conducted would be on the vendor: Weast v. Derrick, ioo Pa. 59,
1882. The price received at a resale is strong, but it would not be
proper to say in all jurisdictions conclusive, evidence of value: Gardner
v. Armstrong, 31 MO. 535, 1862,
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